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PLAYING WITH FIRE
Gregory S. Alexandert
In his very interesting Article in this Symposium, Professor David
Spence' tries to perform a heroic task. He attempts to coopt public
choice theory in the service of progressive politics. He is not content
to allow the conventional political valence associated with public
choice theory to remain unchallenged. That valence is, of course, resoundingly antigovernment and pro-market. The basic normative lesson that most public choice theorists derive from their positive
analysis of politics is political minimalism, a zero-sum strategy of empowering the private sphere at the expense of the public sphere.
Spence wants to flip this normative implication of public choice theory on its head, or at least to challenge its assertion of the inevitability
of public corruption. He seeks to appropriate public choice theory's
analytical framework on behalf of a decidedly progressive political
agenda.
Why a progressively inclined administrative law scholar would
adopt this strategy is, I think, clear. It is a case of fighting fire with
fire. The thinking here is that rather than rejecting the enemy's
premises, which only results in the Right and Left talking past each
other, you engage and then defeat (or at least destabilize) the enemy
by turning her own arguments against her conclusions.
This sounds pretty clever, and it is-clever, I mean. But it is also
risky. In this Comment I shall briefly describe three risks that this
strategy involves. First, it risks reinforcing the perception of political
preferences as exogenous and static. Second, it risks restricting the
available vocabulary by which administrative law specialists analyze
and understand politics to that of individual preference-maximization. Third, it isolates administrative law scholars from other analytical frameworks that have considerably more politically liberating
potential.

t A. Robert Noll Professor of Law, Cornell University. I am grateful to my colleagues
Cynthia Farina and Jeff Rachlinski for asking me to participate in this Symposium and to
them and other commentators for commenting on my comments.
I David B. Spence, A Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 397
(2002).
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I
REINFORCING THE STATIC IMAGE OF PREFERENCES

Professor Spence is aware of the recent literature that critiques,
on positive grounds, the rational actor model. 2 Indeed, his Article
explicitly emphasizes that he does not fully buy into rational actor theory. Nevertheless, embracing public choice theory's analytical
method implies a degree of endorsement of rational actor theory's
conception of individual preferences as given and fixed. As a result
Professor Spence's Article fails seriously to integrate the critiques of
rational actor theory. Once one concedes the basic validity of public
choice theory's vision of politics it becomes too easy for Right-leaning
students of the administrative state to say, in response to suggestions
that the process of preference-formation is far more fluid and contextdependent than rational actor theory admits, 'Yes, yes, I know all
about that, but those objections are just marginal." Alternatively, politically conservative scholars respond, "Look, if you clutter up the
model with a lot of reality, you're going to weaken it so much that it
loses all predictive capacity." These responses exemplify exactly the
sort of thinking that Progressives like Spence ought to be fighting.
Doing so requires taking far more seriously than Spence does the critiques of rational actor theory. Taking those critiques seriously would
lead Progressives to adopt a very different positive model of politics
than the one they endorse.
II
WINNING THE BATLE BUT LOSING THE WAR

The second risk that Professor Spence, as a political Progressive
who endorses public choice theory, faces is that he may win the battle
but lose the war. By that I mean the following: If you use public
choice theory to advance some discrete item on the Progressive
agenda, you may succeed in that limited respect but retard the Progressive agenda in the long run. The strategy of using positive public
choice theory to argue against its normative implications for some particular issue inherently concedes the legitimacy of public choice theory's premises tout court. Professor Spence's strategy limits the range
of analytical concepts that are available in theorizing about politics
and the administrative state. It restricts Progressives to talking only in
terms of individual self-interest, personal incentives, preference-maximization, and the like. Progressives who pursue this path self-censor
not only their own analytical vocabulary, but the very premises of their
vision of politics.
2
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III
IGNORANCE ISN'T ALWAYS BLISS

The third risk follows directly from the second. The strategy that
Professor Spence pursues may well distract scholars from studying and
applying other theories of democratic politics that are more
straightforwardedly progressive. To provide only one example, I am
always struck when I flip through the legal literature on administrative
law by the nearly total lack of attention paid to the work of Jurgen
Habermas's discourse theory of democracy. 3 Now, I don't expect my
colleagueJon Macey to cite Habermas, but there are other administrative law scholars (including Professor Spence) who might well find
Habermas's work both novel and illuminating.
Permit me to use a personal experience to illustrate my point.
For several years now, my colleague Steve Shiffrin and I have regularly
attended a colloquium on politics and social theory organized by
Professors Jean Cohen, Axel Honnuth, and Frank Michelman and
held in Prague. The colloquium attracts scholars from all over Europe and from a variety of disciplines, including law, government, sociology, and philosophy. The European participants are all fully
aware of public choice theory, but they find it normatively impoverished and analytically incomplete. They are far more interested in
working out the implications of Habermas's view that "the success of
deliberative politics depends not on a collectively acting citizenry but
on the institutionalization of the corresponding procedures and conditions of communication, as well as on the interplay of institutionalized deliberative processes with informally developed public
'4
opinions.
The point is not that Habermas has discovered the one true path
to democratic politics, but that his work, and the work of others, offer
American administrative law scholars a very different vocabulary for
discussing the administrative state. Progressive scholars might find
that this vocabulary fits their vision of democracy, certainly on the normative level, but quite possibly on the positive level as well, much better than the vocabulary of public choice.
To dose these ramblings, let me return to my earlier metaphor of
fighting fire with fire. Sometimes that strategy succeeds. We all know,
however, that whenever you play with fire you might get burned. As
that consummate rational actor, Smokey Bear, says, "Remember, only
YOU can prevent Federalist fires."
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Habermas's most recent work on the subject iSJORGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS
NoRis: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAv AND DEMOCRACY (William
Rehg trans., 1996).
4 Id. at 298.
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